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INTEREST-FREE LOANS: THE GIFT
AND ESTATE TAX PLANNERS'
DREAM - ARE WE ABOUT TO BE
AWAKENED?
ANN G. MANDELMAN* AND ALBERT H. HEBER**
In the continuing attempt to reduce one's tax liability, in-
terest-free loans have received a good deal of attention. In
light of the favorable tax consequences of the legislation in
this area, the attention is well deserved.
In Crown v. Commissioner,1 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that interest-free loans incur no gift tax conse-
quences. This decision has had a pervasive impact in the gift
tax area. By upholding the form of the transaction over its
substance in a case involving large sums of money, the court
provided a method of effective gift tax avoidance.
This article is written from the perspective of a tax plan-
ner. The article reviews the legislative history of the gift tax
provisions along with the cases which have construed the gift
tax consequences of interest-free loans. In addition, the article
examines the efficacy of alternative methods of income split-
ting. The article concludes with planning guidelines, gleaned
from the case law, which may be helpful in evaluating whether
a particular interest-free loan transaction will be gift tax free.
Obviously, the guidelines do not guarantee success. However,
following them should at least increase the probability that an
interest-free loan will not be subject to gift tax.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE GIFT TAX PROVISIONS
A. Definition of the Gift Tax
In determining whether the value of the use of money is a
transfer subject to imposition of the gift tax under Internal
* C.P.A., B.S. Accounting, Brooklyn College, 1978, Member - Wisconsin Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants; senior in the tax department of Arthur Young &
Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
** B.A., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1975; M.S., University of Wisconsin,
1980; J.D. John Marshall Law School, 1979; Member, Illinois Bar; staff person in the
tax department of Arthur Young & Company, Chicago, Illinois.
1. 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), aff'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
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Revenue Code (Code) section 2511, an analysis of the statu-
tory language and the legislative history, furnished by the
Committee Reports describing the Revenue Act of 1932,2 is
necessary. This analysis indicates that the position enunciated
by the Internal Revenue Service (Service) in the related cases
and through its revenue rulings,3 while theoretically sound,
has not received judicial acceptance.
Code section 2501 imposes a tax "on the transfer of prop-
erty" by gift.4 In addition, the Code provides that "the tax
imposed by Code section 2501 shall apply whether the trans-
fer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indi-
rect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or
intangible."'5 "Property" has been broadly interpreted in the
legislative comments as including "every species of right or in-
terest protected by law and having an exchangeable value."'
The Supreme Court recognized the comprehensiveness of the
statute by stating that the gift tax statute was enacted "to hit
all the protean arrangements which the wit of man can devise
that are not business transactions within the meaning of ordi-
nary speech."'7
The Service's position that "the right to use property, in
this case money,"" is deemed to be property merely reflects
prior case law in which money was considered to be property9
which had an exchangeable value measured by interest.10
Therefore, it appears that the concept of value would require
that the transfer of the right to use money should be recog-
2. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Seas. 28 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2)
C.B. at 457; S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part
2) C.B. at 496.
3. Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408 involved a taxpayer who advanced $250,000 to
a corporation wholly owned by his son in return for a $200,000 demand note and a
$50,000 note payable in 10 years. Each note provided for the repayment of the princi-
pal sum without interest. The Service stated that when an interest-free loan is made,
the gift tax will be imposed on the value of the right to use the money, computed
according to current interest rates and the conditions for repayment of the loan.
4. LR.C. § 2501 (1976 & West Supp. 1981).
5. I.R.C. § 2511 (1976).
6. 585 F.2d at 238.
7. Comm'r v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945).
8. Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408, 409.
9. Tri-Lakes S.S. Co. v. Conm'r, 146 F.2d 970, 972 (6th Cir. 1945); H.R. REP. No.
708, supra note 2; S. REP. No. 665, supra note 2.
10. Comm'r v. Meyer, 139 F.2d 256, 259 (6th Cir. 1943); Priess v. United States,
42 F. Supp. 89, 91 (E.D. Wash. 1941).
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nized as an item of property subject to gift tax. However,
while interest-free loans provide the grantee with the right to
use money, the courts have not subjected the transfers to gift
tax.
B. Purposes of the Gift Tax
There are two principal functions of the gift tax: first, to
discourage taxpayers from shifting income from higher tax
brackets to lower tax brackets through income splitting; sec-
ond, to "discourage transfers for the purpose of avoiding the
estate tax."11
When a high bracket taxpayer makes an interest-free loan
directly to a child or to a trust set up for the child, the income
earned from the use of the loaned funds will be taxed to the
child. Ordinarily, the child has little or no other income. Con-
sequently, the income from the funds will be taxed at lower
rates than if earned by the lender.3 Furthermore, the high
bracket taxpayer will avoid gift tax liability on the transfer of
the principal.13 If the lender had first invested the funds and
then transferred the income derived therefrom to the child,
the high bracket taxpayer would be subject to both income
tax on the income earned from his investment1  and gift tax
upon transfer of the income.' 5 Thus, the tax-free, interest-free
loan circumvents the income splitting deterrent of the gift tax
statute.
The statute's attempt to prevent the depletion of one's es-
tate is also frustrated by the interest-free loan. Although the
lender's estate will include the full face amount of the inter-
est-free demand note receivable,"" the lender's estate will be
11. The gift tax will supplement both the estate tax and the income tax. It will
tend to reduce the incentive to make gifts in order that distribution of future income
from the donated property may be to a number of persons, with the result that taxes
imposed by the higher brackets of income tax are avoided. H.R. RE. No. 708, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (193%); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1932). See, e.g.,
Harris v. Comm'r, 340 U.S. 106, 107 (1950); Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 179
n.1 (1943); Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73, 77 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
12. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1976).
13. A gift is incomplete in every instance in which the donor reserves the power to
revest the beneficial title to the property in himself. Tress. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (1958).
14. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1976).
15. IR.C. § 2501(a) (West Supp. 1981).
16. The loan principal is included in the lender's estate. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-4
(1958).
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depleted to the extent of the uncharged interest. The Seventh
Circuit in Crown recognized that the lender's estate is de-
pleted by the amount of the uncharged interest; however, the
court did not wish to extend the function of the gift tax stat-
ute to include the diminution of a lender's potential estate as
well as his actual estate.1" This is consistent with the Tax
Court's view that the value of the right to use the principal is
not a property interest capable of being transferred."8
II. GIFT TAx TREATMENT OF ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF
INCOME SPLITTING
A. Short Term Trusts
In an attempt to achieve overall family tax reduction, peo-
ple owning income producing property often wish to pass the
income generated to family members who are in lower tax
brackets. To accomplish this income splitting .and yet retain
ownership and a significant degree of control over the prop-
erty, taxpayers frequently use a short term trust. The income
interest of the trust is designated to the individual to whom
the grantor desires to shift income. The corpus reverts to the
grantor after the duration of the trust.
The type of trust used can either be irrevocable for a spec-
ified period of time, for example, a Clifford trust, or revocable
at the will of the grantor. The Clifford trust is a short term
irrevocable inter vivos trust which got its name from the 1940
Supreme Court case of Helvering v. Clifford.19 For a trust to
qualify as a Clifford trust it must be irrevocable for at least
ten years and one day or for the life of the grantor, and the
grantor must not have power to control the income during
that time.2" If a trust qualifies, the grantor is not taxed on the
income of the trust21 but must pay gift tax on the value of the
17. Crown v. Comm'r, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
18. By denying that the right to use money constitutes an interest in property, the
Seventh Circuit ignores Blackburn v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 204 (1953), which held that the
difference between a lower-than-market interest rate charged and the market rate of
interest constituted a taxable gift, and Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir.
1975), where the Seventh Circuit held that the gratuitous transfers to a charitable
organization of the right to use money was deductible as a contribution.
19. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
20. LR.C. §§ 671, 673-674, 676-677 (1976). The grantor must also not have "pow-
ers of administration" as defined in I.R.C. § 675 (1976).
21. Id. § 671. For purposes of this article, it is assumed that all trust income is
[Vol. 65:367
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income interest transferred.22 If the trust does not qualify, the
grantor will pay gift tax on the gifted income interest and in-
come tax on the income the trust generates.23
For example, assume that X transfers $200,000 in cash to
each of two separate trusts which designate X's son, Y, as
beneficiary. Trust A, which is irrevocable for eleven years (or
the life of X), 24 qualifies as a Clifford trust and directs that Y
receive trust income for the life of the trust. Upon termina-
tion of the trust, either by revocation or the death of X, the
corpus reverts to X or his estate. Trust B also specifies that Y
receive trust income for the life of the trust, but is revocable
at any time and thus does not qualify as a Clifford trust. Both
trusts A and B deposit the corpus in a savings institution at
5.75% annual interest.
In contrast, assume X establishes two additional trusts, C
and D, both of which, like A, are irrevocable for eleven years
and qualify as Clifford trusts. Trusts C and D, however, are
established with only a minimal amount of cash. Thereafter,
X makes interest-free loans of $200,000 to each trust. The
loan to trust C is for a term of eleven years, while the loan to
trust D is recoverable on demand. Both of these trusts deposit
the money loaned in 5.75% savings accounts.
In substance, X has accomplished the same economic re-
sults with trusts C and D as with trusts A and B, respectively,
that is, X may not recover his money from trusts A and C for
eleven years while he can recover his money from trusts B and
distributed currently rather than accumulated. The income therefore is taxable either
to the grantor or to the beneficiary, but not to the trust.
22. I.R.C. §§ 2501, 2511 (1976); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958). An irrevocable
gift of an income interest is valued and taxed as a single gift at the time of assign-
ment rather than as a series of gifts each year as the interest is earned. Lockard v.
Comm'r, 166 F.2d 409, 412 (1st Cir. 1948); Helvering v. McCormack, 135 F.2d 294,
296 (2d Cir. 1943). The value of the gift is computed per Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-9(e)
(1970).
23. Where the grantor of an irrevocable trust is taxed on the trust income, the
assignment of trust income to the beneficiaries is still taxed as a single gift at the
time the assignment is made. See Lockard v. Comm'r, 166 F.2d 409, 412 (1st Cir.
1948); Rohmer v. Comm'r, 21 T.C. 1099 (1954). See also Galt v. Comm'r, 216 F.2d 41
(7th Cir. 1954).
Where a revocable trust is involved, however, there may be a question as to
whether there is even a gift. See, e.g., Estate of Holtz v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 37 (1962).
In such a case, the grantor pays a gift tax each year as the gift is made.
24. X, who is 72 years old, has an actuarial life of 11 years. Table I, Treas. Reg. §
1.72-9 (1956).
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D on demand. In addition, in all four trust situations the
$11,500 annual interest income accrues to Y as beneficiary.
The gift and income tax consequences, however, are signifi-
cantly different. Regarding the gift tax, X will be taxed on a
gift of $94,080 in the case of trust A25 and on a yearly gift of
$11,500 in the case of trust B.26 Trusts C and D, however, will
have no gift tax consequences since, following the Crown ra-
tionale, X has not made any gifts by only making loans to the
trusts.
With respect to income taxes, the income of trust A is tax-
able to Y as the income beneficiary but the $11,500 annual
interest income of trust B, because trust B does not qualify as
a Clifford trust, is taxable to X. The income of trusts C and
D, both of which qualify as Clifford trusts, is taxable to Y. Yet
trust D in substance is as revocable as trust B since X may
demand repayment of the loan at any time.17
These hypothetical trusts illustrate that loaning money in-
terest-free to a trust is the economic equivalent of transferring
money or other assets into a trust as corpus. However, by us-
ing interest-free loans instead of trust corpus, a person may
split income without abiding by the grantor trust rules of
Code sections 671-678, as well as avoid the gift taxes that
would otherwise be imposed. In addition, the estate tax conse-
quences to the lender are more advantageous when interest-
25. See supra note 22. The value, for gift tax purposes, of the 11 year income
interest in trust A is determined under Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-9(e) (1970). The regula-
tion states that the tables in Treas. Reg. § 25.2031-10 are to be used in calculating the
value of an income interest that is dependent on both the continuation of a life and a
concurrent term certain, as is the case with trust A. From Table LN of Treas. Reg. §
25.2031-10 is obtained the factor of .47040 for a 72 year old male. The factor .47040 is
multiplied by the principal of $200,000 to yield a $94,080 gift. The amount of the
taxable gift is then determined by subtracting the $10,000 annual exclusion, per
I.R.C. § 2503(b) (West Supp. 1981), from $94,080. (This assumes X's spouse, if living,
does not elect under LR.C. § 2513 (West Supp. 1981) to treat one-half of X's gift as
her own.)
26. The gift of $11,500 represents the 5.75% return on the $200,000 gift. This is,
however reduced by the $10,000 annual exclusion under I.R.C. § 2503(b) (West Supp.
1981) to yield a taxable gift of $1,500. (This assumes that X's spouse, if living, does
not elect under LR.C. § 2513 to treat one-half of X's gift as her own.)
27. There are apparently no cases addressing the issue of whether interest-free
loans, particularly where the grantor is the lender, should be treated as the corpus of
the trust. It is likely that if and when a court is faced with his issue the result will be
to treat such loans as corpus for tax purposes.
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free loans are used to fund a trust than when the same money
is passed outright as trust corpus."8
B. Private Annuities
A private annuity29 is a common estate planning tool typi-
cally used by parents to remove appreciating or income pro-
ducing properties from their estates and thereby allow their
children to benefit from further appreciation or future in-
come.30 In return for the property received, the transferee-
child promises to make annuity payments to the transferor-
parent for the remainder of the parent's life. The transferor is
compelled to recognize as ordinary income the interest ele-
ment of the annuity payments.3 1 This interest element, which
the transferor must recognize on a pro rata basis as each an-
nuity payment is received, is the difference between the sum
of all annuity payments and the present value of those pay-
ments.2 In addition, any difference between the value of the
property transferred and the present value of the total annu-
ity payments is considered a taxable gift from the transferor
to the transferee, or vice versa, depending on whether the
28. In all four trusts, A, B, C, and D, the $200,000 will be included in X's estate
under I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2033 and 2038 (1976), since trusts A and B terminate on X's
death (or sooner) and trusts C and D involve loans which naturally are part of X's
estate. With respect to trusts C and D this is the total estate tax consequence. With
respect to trust A, however, X must also add to is taxable estate a taxable gift of
$84,080 (see supra note 25) plus any gift tax paid on the gift if it was made within
three years of death. I.R.C. §§ 2001(b), 2035(c) (West Supp. 1981). These same re-
sults will occur with respect to the annual taxable gift of $1,500 from trust B. Al-
though X will get a credit against his estate tax liability for any gift taxes paid, I.R.C.
§ 2012 (West Supp. 1981), the credit may not completely offset the estate tax on the
same gifted amounts (even tough there is a unified estate and gift tax) since the value
of the gift is taxed for gift tax purposes at the bottom brackets of the unified tax
schedule and it is taxed at the top unified tax brackets when it is included in X's
estate for estate tax purposes.
29. An annuity is considered a private annuity when the transferee, i.e., the per-
son making the annuity payments, is not in the business of selling annuities. I.R.C. §
72 (1976) covers the tax treatment of both private and commercial annuities.
30. The property is removed from the parents' estate without a gift tax because
an annuity is in essence a sale.
31. I.R.C. § 72 (1976); Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43.
32. The total of the annuity payments, technically called the expected return, is
calculated by multiplying the annuity payment by the transferor's actuarial life ob-
tained from Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 (1956). The present value of the total annuity pay-
ments is called the investment in the contract and is found in Table A(1) of Treas.
Reg. § 20.2031-10(f) (1970). By dividing the expected return into the investment in
the contract, an exclusion ratio is obtained which reflects the percentage of each
yearly payment which the transferor may exclude from income.
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transferred property or the annuity contract has the greater
value.33
As an example of a typical private annuity, consider the
following: X, who is seventy-two years old, transfers to Y
$200,000 in return for Y's promise to pay X $20,000 per year
for X's remaining life (actuarily determined to be eleven
years). Anticipated payments over the eleven year period total
$220,000. The present value of the payments, however, equals
only $128,246.34 The transferor, therefore must recognize the
$91,754 difference as interest income by including in his gross
income $8,340 of each $20,000 payment received. 5 In addi-
tion, the $71,754 difference between the fair market values of
the property given (the cash of $200,000), and the property
received (the annuity contract worth $128,246), is a gift from
the transferor subject to gift tax. 6
Compare these results with the use of interest-free loans in
the same situation. X makes ten interest-free demand loans of
$20,000 each to Y and each year demands repayment of one
such loan.3 7 Under present law there would be no tax effects
to either X or Y.s X pays no gift tax under the Crown ratio-
nale, nor must he recognize any income as the loans are re-
paid, since to date there is no case or law requiring imputa-
tion of interest on interest-free intrafamily loans. X and Y
have accomplished the same nontax results with interest-free
loans as they would have accomplished by using a traditional
private annuity, yet interest-free loans allow X to make a tax-
33. I.R.C. § 2501 (1976 & West Supp. 1981). See supra note 32.
34. See supra note 32. From Table I of Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 (1976) is obtained the
expected life of 11.0, which is multiplied by the annuity payment of $20,000 per year
to yield an expected return of $220,000. From Table A(1) of Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-
10(f) (1970) is obtained a factor of 6.4123 which is multiplied by the annuity payment
of $20,000 to give $128,246, the investment in the contract.
35. See supra notes 32 & 34. Dividing the expected return of $220,000 into the
investment in the contract of $128,246 gives a 58.3% exclusion ratio. Thus, 41.7% of
each $20,000 payment is included in income.
36. I.R.C. § 2501 (1976 & West Supp. 1981). The gift of $71,754 is reduced by the
$10,000 annual exclusion allowed by I.R.C. § 2503(b) to obtain a taxable gift of
$61,754. (This assumes that X's spouse, if living, does not elect under I.R.C. § 2513
(West Supp. 1981) to treat one-half of X's gift as her own.)
37. Alternatively, X could make one loan for $200,000 and allow Y to make partial
repayments. This would avoid the appearance of transacting what is in substance a
private annuity in the form of interest-free loans.
38. Y, of course, will be liable for income tax on any income earned from the
investment of the principal of the loan.
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free gift as well as avoid any recognition of interest income as
he receives his money back. Moreover, demand loans provide
greater flexibility by allowing the transferor to demand repay-
ment as he wishes, instead of binding him to the fixed pay-
ment schedule of an annuity contract. The estate tax conse-
quences of using an interest-free loan in place of a private
annuity, however, should also be considered as they may be
negative or positive.3 9
III. CASE LAW
A. Crown v. Commissioner
Lester Crown and his two brothers were equal partners in
Areljay Company, Not Incorporated, an Illinois general part-
nership formed in 1944. Prior to and during 1967, the partner-
ship made various interest-free loans 0 to twenty-four trusts'1
for their children and relatives. No interest was paid or de-
manded on these loans during 1967.42
39. With respect to interest-free loans, the loaned money will be brought back
into X's estate by repayment before X's death or by inclusion in his estate if the
loans are still outstanding at his death. I.R.C. § 2031 (1976). In the case of a private
annuity, on the other hand, the amount that will be included in X's estate is uncer-
tain. If X dies before reaching his actuarial life, X's estate has no right to receive
additional payments, unless the contract has a "guaranteed amount" clause, even
though X's investment in the annuity contract has not been fully recovered. If X,
however, lives longer than his actuarial life, he will receive back more than his invest-
ment in the annuity contract. The estate of X, therefore, will be either larger by using
interest-free loans in place of a private annuity, or smaller, depending upon whether
X dies before or after his actuarial life expectancy. It should be noted that where X
dies before reaching his actuarial life, the unrecovered portion of his investment in
the annuity contract effectively passes to Y without that amount ever being subject to
gift or estate tax. (Certain adjustments to Y's basis in the property received may be
required. See Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-1 C.B. 352.)
40. Total loans were $18,030,024, represented by demand notes of $2,073,649 and
loans on open account of $15,956,375. Both the open account loans and the loans
represented by demand notes were considered by the Seventh Circuit as equivalent
due to both forms involving loans of money repayable on demand and with no provi-
sion for the payment of interest. 585 F.2d at 237 n.9. The demand notes made no
provision for payment of interest before demand but did provide for interest of 6%
per annum after demand. During 1967 the market prime rate of interest averaged
5.63%. Crown v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 1060, 1061 (1977), aff'd 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.
1978).
41. Loans were made to the trusts of 12 children of the partners, 11 children of
first cousins of the partners and to a trust for a first cousin of the partners. Id. at
1060. Gifts to a trust are treated as having been made to the beneficiaries of the trust
and not to the trustee. Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393 (1941).
42. 67 T.C. at 1061.
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The Service assessed a deficiency of $362,135.92 on the
taxpayer's 1967 gift tax return. The Commissioner computed
the deficiency by determining the value of the use of the
money loaned by the three Areljay partners and allocating
one-third to each partner.4
The Seventh Circuit, in accord with the decision of the
Tax Court," held that interest-free loans under the facts
presented in the case did not constitute taxable gifts under
the gift tax laws. Both the seventh circuit and the Tax Court
relied on Johnson v. United States,45 which also held that in-
terest-free loans to family members, repayable upon demand,
did not constitute taxable gifts.
The Tax Court set forth the following factors as the basis
of its decision: (1) despite the existence of the statutory au-
thorities cited 6 since the inception of the income and gift tax
laws, the Service was only now asserting that the making of
interest-free loans constituted a taxable event;47 (2) following
the district court's holding in Johnson, the purpose of the gift
tax laws4 would not be circumvented since the principal of
the interest-free loans would remain in the lender's estate;' 9
(3) by refusing to hold that parents must deal with their chil-
dren at arm's length and charge interest for an intrafamily
loan, the court stated that it is the role of Congress to enact
specific legislation recognizing such transactions as taxable
events;50 (4) the courts have uniformly rejected every attempt
43. The Service contended that a reasonable rate of interest for 1967 would be 6%
per annum and computed the gift by applying that rate on a daily basis to outstand-
ing balances of the amounts due. Id.
44. 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
45. 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
46. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (1976) ("A tax ... is hereby imposed ... on the transfer
of property by gift . . . ."); I.R.C. § 2511(a) (1976) ("[The gift tax] shall apply
whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and
whether the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible . . . ."); Treas. Reg. §
25.2511-1(c) (1958) ("The gift tax also applies to gifts indirectly made. Thus, all
transactions whereby property or property rights or interests are gratuitously passed
or conferred upon another, regardless of the means or device employed, constitute
gifts subject to tax.").
47. 67 T.C. at 1063.
48. "[T]he purpose of the gift tax is to complement the estate tax by preventing
tax-free depletion of the transferor's estate during his lifetime." Harris v. Comm'r,
340 U.S. 106, 107 (1950). See also Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943).
49. 67 T.C. at 1063.
50. Id. at 1064.
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by the Service to subject the making of interest-free loans to
income or gift taxes;51 and (5) it would be administratively
unmanageable to apply the gift tax to situations involving the
intrafamily sharing or gratuitous use of real or personal
property.5 2
On the other hand, Judge Simpson, in dissent, contended
that the holding of the Tax Court was inconsistent with the
explicit terms of the gift tax statute,53 the intended scope of
the gift tax statute as stated in the legislative history," and
the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the provi-
sion.5 Judge Simpson maintained that the value of the prop-
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1065.
53. Id. (Simpson, J., dissenting).
"Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth, then the amount by which the value of the property ex-
ceeded the value of the consideration shall be deemed a gift . "I.R.C. § 2512(b)
(West Supp. 1981).
Transfers reached by the gift tax are not confined to those only which, be-
ing without a valuable consideration, accord with the common law concept of
gifts, but embrace as well sales, exchanges, and other dispositions of property
for a consideration to the extent that the value of the property transferred by
the donor exceeds the value in money or money's worth of the consideration
given therefor. However, a sale, exchange, or other transfer of property made
in the ordinary course of business (a transaction which is bona fide, at arm's
length, and free from any donative intent), will be considered as made for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958).
54. 67 T.C. at 1066 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
The terms "property," "transfer," "gift," and "indirectly" are used in the
broadest and most comprehensive sense, the term "property" reaching every
species of right or interest protected by law and having an exchangeable value.
The words "transfer... by gift" and "whether... direct or indirect" are
designed to cover and comprehend all transactions (subject to certain express
conditions and limitations) whereby, and to the extent ... that, property or a
property right is donatively passed to or conferred upon another, regardless of
the means or the device employed in its accomplishment. H.R. RzP. No. 708,
72d Cong., lst Sess. (1932), 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2), 457, 476; S. REP. No. 665, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 496, 524.
Id.
55. To reinforce the evident desire of Congress to hit all the protean arrange-
ments which the wit of man can devise that are not business transactions
within the meaning of ordinary speech, the Treasury Regulations make clear
that no genuine business transaction comes within the purport of the gift tax
by excluding "a sale, exchange, or other transfer of property made in the ordi-
nary course of business (a transaction which is bona fide, at arm's length, and
free from any donative intent)." Thus on finding that a transfer in the circum-
stances of a particular case is not made in the ordinary course of business, the
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erty transferred exceeds the value of the consideration fur-
nished when a loan is made interest-free or at a rate of
interest below the prevailing interest rate for such a loan so
that an even exchange has not taken place.58
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the majority opinion of the
Tax Court. The appellate court held that interest-free in-
trafamily loans do not result in a transfer of gift. 7 The court
conceded that the recipient of an interest-free loan was be-
stowed with an economic benefit and that the lender has for-
feited the opportunity to increase his net worth by the
amount of interest foregone. 8 In addition, the use of interest-
free loans was recognized to contravene the other purpose of
the gift tax, that is, protection of the income tax, by prevent-
ing the use of income splitting.59 Nonetheless, the court re-
jected the Commissioner's contention that the use of interest-
free loans serves to avoid estate tax liability. 0
For the most part, the court relied on the same considera-
transfer becomes subject to the gift tax to the extent that it is not made "for
an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth."
Id. at 1067 (Simpson, J., dissenting) (citing Comm'r v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306-07
(1945)).
56. Id. at 1067-69 (Simpson, J., dissenting). Judge Simpson cited Blackburn v.
Comm'r, 20 T.C. 204 (1953), Estate of Bartman v. Comi'r, 10 T.C. 1073 (1948), and
Estate of Bergan v. Comm'r, 1 T.C. 543 (1943) in support of his position. Unlike
Crown, these cases involved property irrevocably transferred for a fixed term promis-
sory note or an annuity whereby the note was reduced to its discounted value and the
annuity to its present value. The dissent addressed the majority's contention that the
discounted value of a demand note could not be determined:
Yet, even though the discounted value of a demand note cannot be ascer-
tained, the privilege of using the borrowed funds interest free is nonetheless
valuable. The difference in facts means merely that we must find a different
means for measuring the value of such privilege, and we are satisfied that the
method used by the Commissioner is reasonable. Instead of valuing the obliga-
tion for repayment at the time of its creation, we wait until the money has
been used for some period of time and then measure the value of such use.
67 T.C. at 1069 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
57. 585 F.2d 234 (.7th Cir. 1978)."
58. 585 F.2d at 235. The court added that it was not necessary that the interest
rate be set at zero in order to transfer an economic benefit, but only that the interest
rate on the loan be less than the appropriate market rate of interest at the time. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 237. Although the court acknowledged the Commissioner's argument as
a policy factor, the court could not find any congressional authority which suggested
that the purpose of protecting the estate tax was concerned with the use of gifts to
diminish a taxpayer's potential estate as well as his actual one.
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tions as did the Tax Court in arriving at its result."1 In the
course of the court's discussion, it rejected each of the Com-
missioner's arguments. Most importantly, it refused to follow
the Commissioner's interpretation of the "unequal exchange"
provision in Code section 2512(b).62
In valuing the use of money involved in the interest-free
loan transfer, the court rejected the Service's position set
forth in Revenue Ruling 73-61. In that ruling the Commis-
sioner states:
The right to use property, in this case money, is itself an
interest in property, the transfer of which is a gift within the
purview of section 2501... unless full and adequate consid-
eration in money or money's worth is received. The tax...
would be imposed on the value of the right to use the
money.63
The ruling goes on to distinguish the time at which the gift is
deemed to be made for two types of loans." For demand
loans, the value of the use of the money is to be computed and
deemed a gift with respect to each quarter the loan is out-
standing. This is in contrast with term loans where present
value of the interest-free use of the money for the entire term
of the loan is deemed to be a completed gift as of the date the
loan is made.
The Seventh Circuit held that this method of valuation is
inconsistent with Code section 2512(b). 65 Under this section,
there is a gift to the extent that adequate and full considera-
tion is not received by the transferor of the property. As the
court noted, the unequal exchange rule "implicitly assumes
that the values being compared will be measured at the same
point in time."66 As was discussed above, for the demand
loans in question in Crown, the Service's position was to com-
pute the gift at the end of each quarter the loan was outstand-
61. 585 F.2d at 236.
62. The Commissioner argued that the promise to repay the loan at some indefi-
nite time in the future, given the time value of money, will be less than the face value
of the note. Id. at 238.
63. Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408, 409.
64. Id.
65. 585 F.2d at 238-39.
66. Id. at 239.
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ing. 7 Because the exchanged properties were compared at dif-
ferent times, the court held that no taxable gift had been
made." The court's analysis highlights the importance of
making demand loans.
The Commissioner's position that interest should be im-
puted at the end of each quarter was premised upon the the-
ory that the promise to repay the loan upon demand is worth
less than the amount of money loaned."9 Yet the Commis-
sioner produced no evidence to show that "demand notes sys-
tematically trade at a discount from face value in the market-
place. '70 Thus, the court rejected the imputation of interest
approach.
The Commissioner suggested two additional bases for the
imputation of a gift tax which were likewise rejected by the
court." First, they dealt with the use of money as a property
right in itself. "The question is whether such an 'at will' inter-
est can properly be characterized as 'property' under the gift
tax laws; i.e., whether it is 'protected by law' and has an 'ex-
changeable value.' ",72 The court noted that certain "at will"
interests were protected at law - interests such as tenancies
at will in real property and contracts terminable at will.a
However, the court rejected the Commissioner's effort to cate-
gorize interest-free loans as an at will property interest. No
evidence had been introduced establishing that the demand
loans had an exchangeable value, or that "the recipient of a
loan payable on demand has a legally protectible interest vis-
a-vis the lender."74
67. Id. The court noted:
The failure to discount the interest imputed in subsequent periods back to the
time of the loan leads to the seeming paradox that if the lender were to permit
the interest-free loan to remain outstanding for a sufficiently long period
before demanding repayment, he would end up paying more in gift taxes than
he would have had he made an outright gift of the loan principal.
Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 238.
71. Id. at 239-40. The court apparently conceded that a property interest - the
right to use money - had been transferred; however, they had conceptual difficulty
in estimating a proper interest rate that ordinarily would have been demanded.
72. Id. at 239.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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Finally, the court rejected the Commissioner's argument
that the gift occurs continuously for as long as the lender ref-
uses to demand repayment. 5 Such an approach, according to
the court, would expand the scope of the gift tax law beyond
what had previously been recognized."6 In rejecting such an
expansion the court relied on the Service's prior ruling: "the
IRS has consistently maintained that a donation of a use of
property that is not a 'legally enforceable conveyance' does
not constitute a gift of 'property' within the meaning of the
charitable contribution provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code.17
The court concluded by noting that the Service had just
recently asserted its present position that an interest-free loan
could have gift tax consequences.78 After all, the Service did
not appeal twelve years earlier when its position was rejected
in Johnson v. United States. Moreover, the Service waited
for seven years to publicly declare its nonacquiescence in the
Johnson result.80 Before this time no authority suggested that
interest-free loans would give rise to a taxable gift.8 1 Thus, the
75. Id. at 240.
76. Id. The court noted that absent a contractual obligation the borrower is not
required to pay interest. Despite this conceptual distinction by the court, both the
interest-free loan and the forgiveness of indebtedness do serve to deplete the estate of
the lender which the gift tax was designed to prevent. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(a),
T.D. 6334, 1958-2 C.B. 627, 643 ("a taxable transfer may be effected by. . .the for-
giving of a debt").
77. See I.T. 3918, 1948-2 C.B. 33; Rev. Rul. 70-477, 1970-2 C.B. 62.
78. 585 F.2d at 241. Blackburn v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 204 (1953), Mason v. United
States, 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975) and Comm'r v. Edwards, 135 F.2d 574 (7th Cir.
1943) were deemed to constitute only "indirect support" for the "unequal exchange"
approach of I.R.C. § 2512(b). Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex.
1966), a case directly on point, was contrary to the Commissioner's position. Further-
more, courts have been reluctant to make the granting of interest-free or low interest
loans a taxable event in the absence of express statutory authority. Joseph Lupowitz
Sons, Inc. v. Comm'r, 497 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974); Saunders v. United States, 294 F.
Supp. 1276 (D. Hawaii 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 450 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1971);
Dean v. Comm'r, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961); LR.C. § 483 (1976 & West Supp. 1981); Treas.
Reg. § 1.482-2.
79. 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
80. Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.
81. 585 F.2d at 241. The court was also concerned with the potential overreach of
a decision which would find a taxable gift:
The same reasoning that leads to the finding of a taxable gift when $18 million
is loaned by a parent to his children for investment purposes would find a gift
where a father lends a thousand dollars to his son graduating from college until
he can get established, or even where an office worker lends a fellow employee
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court felt that it would be more appropriate for Congress to
arrive at this result rather than have it judicially mandated. s
B. Johnson v. United States
In Johnson v. United States,s s Mr. and Mrs. Johnson
made a series of interest-free demand loans to their children.8 4
The loans were outstanding for more than five years and were
eventually repaid without interest just prior to the father's
death.8 5 The IRS assessed a gift tax deficiency "on the use of
the money at 3- % per annum on the average unpaid bal-
ance for each year.""8 The district court held that the tax-
payer had not made gifts within the meaning of the Code sec-
tion 2501.
At the outset the court noted that it was the first court to
deal with the gift tax question. In arriving at its decision, the
district court reviewed whether the transaction defeated the
purpose of the gift tax. Nothing about the transaction was
found to conflict with the gift tax provisions.a
First, the court noted that people have no obligation to in-
crease or invest their estates.8 8 An estate can be kept in cash.
Thus, the interest-free loans did nothing to decrease the tax-
payer's estate because the unpaid principle amount would be
included in the decedent's estate, and in fact the loans were
repaid before the taxpayer's death.
$10 "until next payday." Similar reasoning might find the presence of a gift
when a neighbor borrows your lawnmower and fails to return it immediately,
or when out-of-town guests ae provided a night's lodging by friends instead of
going to a hotel.
Id. This view espoused by the court does not reflect the fact that no tax effect would
result in most cases involving small interest-free loans because of the $10,000 exclu-
sion ($3,000 for gifts made after Dec. 31, 1970 and before Jan. 1, 1982). Spouses who
elect gift splitting will be entitled to an exclusion of $20,000 under I.R.C. § 2503(b).
Therefore, a couple electing gift splitting will be allowed to make an interest-free
demand loan of $166,667, assuming an imputed interest rate of 12%, to their child
without incurring any gift tax liability. This supports the view of the Service in Rev.
Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408, 409 that only large loans will be subject to scrutiny.
82. Id.
83. 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
84. Id. at 73.
85. Id. at 76.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 77.
88. Id.
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The district court focused solely on the estate tax avoid-
ance purpose of the gift tax. 9 The court failed to discuss the
other purpose of the gift tax - to discourage income shifting.
In addition, the court failed to analyze whether a property in-
terest - the right to use money - was transferred.90 While
the court was correct in asserting that there is no legal re-
quirement that the children be charged interest, there is pre-
cedent that treats the right to use money as an interest in
property whose transfer constitutes a gift unless full and ade-
quate consideration in money or money's worth is received.9"
C. The Blackburn and Mason Decisions
In Blackburn v. Commissioner,92 the taxpayer transferred
real property worth $245,000 to her two children, receiving a
term note in the face amount of $172,527.65 which carried an
annual interest rate of 2- % with both principal and interest
payable over a thirty-four year, six-month period.9
The Commissioner contended that where the note bore in-
terest at only 2-'/ % per annum and the usual rate of interest
charged on comparable notes was 4% per annum, the differ-
ence between the fair market value of the note and its face
amount constituted a gift.94 The court sustained the Commis-
sioner's position, holding that the consideration was the dis-
counted value of the notes, roughly $134,000, and, in accor-
dance with Code section 2512(b), a gift occurred to the extent
the value of the property exceeded that amount.95 The court
arrived at its decision because the note was a term note for a
considerable number of years.
In Mason v. United States,96 the taxpayer transferred his
interest in a corporation to a charitable organization in return
for a small amount of cash and an unsecured note for the re-
89. Id.
90. Id. In Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408, 409 the Service announced that it
would not acquiesce in the decision of the Johnson court.
91. The right to use money is similar to the situation where a lessee obtains a
right to use property by payment of rent. In the case of a lender the right to use
money is obtained through the payment of interest. See Peacock v. Comm'r, 256 F.2d
160 (5th Cir. 1958); Allen v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 12 (1971).
92. 20 T.C. 204 (1953).
93. Id. at 204-06.
94. Id. at 206.
95. Id. at 207.
96. 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975).
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maining $112,689.42, payable over twenty years with interest
at 4% .97 The uncontested discount value of the note, attribu-
table to "the low interest rate, the lack of security, and the
credit standing of the obligor," was determined to be $81,000.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Blackburn, held
that the taxpayer could claim the difference between the
value of his interest in the business transferred and the fair
market value of the consideration received as a charitable
contribution. 8
Obviously there are factual differences between Crown and
these cases; however, these differences do not adequately jus-
tify the court's failure to apply the Blackburn and Mason
principles to Crown.9 In both Blackburn and Mason, free or
lower-than-market-rate use of property and money was
treated as a gift while in Crown it was not. The largest and
perhaps most significant difference between these decisions
and Crown is in the type of note which was exchanged: Black-
burn and Mason involved term notes or notes which were to
be paid over a predetermined period of time, while Crown in-
volved demand notes.
Because the time of repayment is not fixed, it is difficult to
determine the present value of a demand note. Clearly, how-
ever, a transfer of a property right has taken place. Unlike a
term loan where the right to use money is transferred at the
time the loan is made, the value of a demand loan must be
measured at some point in the future after the money has
been used.100 This difficulty in measuring the value of the
transfer should not preclude the measurement from being
made.
IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
While Crown is not free from flaws in its reading of the
legislative purpose of the gift and estate tax statutes, the deci-
97. Id. at 26.
98. Id. at 29-30.
99. Judge Simpson, in his dissenting opinion in the Tax Court, cited Estate of
Bartman v. Comm'r, 10 T.C. 1073 (1948), and Estate of Bergan v. Comm'r, 1 T.C. 543
(1943), which held that the present value of the annuity was to be computed and that
if the value of property exceeded the present value of the annuity, there was a taxa-
ble gift. 67 T.C. 1060, 1069 (1977) (Simpson, J., dissenting), afl'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th
Cir. 1978).
100. See Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408, 409.
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sion provides a useful gift and estate tax planning tool. How-
ever, care must be taken to insure that the loan technically
qualifies as a tax-free, interest-free loan. While the Service
has not been so cooperative as to provide a list of guidelines
which will insure that an interest-free loan will be tax-free,
the list which follows has been culled from the various cases
in which the taxpayer has been successful in preventing the
assessment of a gift tax.10 1
The following steps will increase the probability that the
interest-free loan will not be classified as a gift:
1. use cash to make the loan;102
2. evidence the loan by written notes or open accounts;
3. indicate that the loan is payable on demand;103
4. state on the note that the loan is to bear no interest;'0 '
5. be certain the loan is bona fide under local law;105
6. take action on the loan before the statute of limitations
lapses (i.e., collect the old loan and make a new one); 06
101. The Service's position is explained in a recent issue of the Wisconsin Bar
Bulletin. See Phillips, Current Tax Treatment of Interest-Free Loans, 55 Wis. B.
BuLL. 13 (March, 1982).
102. There are two reasons to suspect that a loan of property will result in a taxa-
ble event. First, the court's decision in Crown has been most criticized for being a
victory of form over substance, and therefore any deviation from the form will proba-
bly fail. Second, there are two judicial doctrines that are diametrically opposed to the
findings in Crown and would certainly be used regarding an interest-free loan of non-
cash assets. These doctrines are the "anticipatory assignment of income" doctrine set
forth in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), and the "fruit and tree" doctrine in
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
103. In Crown, the Service argued there was an unequal exchange. The crux of
this argument is the concept of the time value of money. Thus, if payment schedules
or due dates exist, there is a possibility of measuring the value of the economic bene-
fit transferred and characterizing that benefit as a gift. The economic value of a
promise to pay a sum of money at some future date is less than the value of the
money loaned. The fact that demand loans could be called immediately gives no rea-
son to expect the fair value of the promise to repay to be less than the fact amount of
the loans. Estate of Berkman, T.C.M. (P-H) 1979-46; Ltr. Rul. 7905090 (Nov. 2,
1978).
104. It is necessary that the loan affirmatively state that it bears no interest as a
result of judicial decisions holding that low-interest loans are more vulnerable to the
imposition of a gift tax than noninterest bearing loans. Mason v. United States, 513
F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975); Blackburn v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 204 (1953).
105. In the findings of both Johnson and Crown, it was stipulated that the loans
were bona fide. One may infer from this that if the loans had not been bona fide, the
courts may have reached different conclusions.
106. Estate of Lang v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 404 (1975), modified, 613 F.2d 770 (9th
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7. establish a history of repayments;" ' and
8. avoid forgiveness of the loan where possible, particularly
if other loans are outstanding or new loans are
contemplated."1 8
There is one interest-free loan arrangement that may have
adverse income tax results and merits attention. Assume a
parent does not have cash to lend to his or her child, borrows
the money from a bank and lends it, interest free, to the child.
This would seem to be the best of both worlds - the parent is
not taxed on the interest income earned and will have a de-
duction for the interest paid to the bank. Although this plan
is being widely recommended, it may be challenged in the
courts. Following the reasoning of Creel v. Commissioner,"'9
the parent may be treated merely as an agent for the child
and will either be denied an interest deduction or have the
interest payments treated as taxable gifts to the child. Al-
though this has no bearing on the gift tax implications of
other interest-free loans, it deserves mention due to its likely
adverse income tax effects. If one does want to use this ar-
rangement, one should take extra precautions to have the loan
from the bank and the loan to the child as separate and dis-
tinct as possible.
V. CONCLUSION
Beyond the specific technical requirements of the loan, a
few comments are necessary regarding the spirit of the inter-
Cir. 1980). Grace Lang made various interest-free loans to her son. Some of the loans
were forgiven and reported by Mrs. Lang as gifts. Other loans were never repaid and
the statute of limitations with respect to collection of these loans lapsed. The Tax
Court upheld the Service's position that a gift took place with respect to the loans
upon which the statute of limitations lapsed at the time of the lapse. The court speci-
fied that it does not wish to take the position that there is a gift every time the
statute of limitations runs on a loan. The court will, however, consider that fact in the
light of other circumstances, e.g., no history of repayment and/or the forgiveness of
some loans, to prove there is no intention to collect the loan.
107. See supra note 100.
108. Id.
109. 72 T.C. 1173 (1979). In Creel, the closely held corporation borrowed money
from a bank and lent it, interest free, to its controlling shareholders. The sharehold-
ers were deemed to have received dividend income and made an interest payment to
the extent that the indebted corporation actually made interest payments. The
court's theory was that the corporation had acted as the shareholders' agent in ob-
taining the loans and had paid the interest on such loans on behalf of the
shareholders.
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est-free loan. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
(ERTA)110 increased the annual gift tax exclusion, starting in
1982, to $10,000 per donee. The intent of the annual exclusion
is to allow various intrafamily transactions to be free of taxa-
tion. It also permits a substantial interest-free loan to avoid
gift taxation.
For example, assume the Service asserts an interest rate of
12% for imputed interest. The $10,000 gift tax annual exclu-
sion would allow a loan of approximately $83,000 to escape
gift tax even if interest were imputed. If two spouses were
willing to take advantage of gift splitting, the couple could
lend as much as $166,000 and still not be concerned about a
gift tax assessment.
The final piece of planning advice in this area is rather
simple. When setting up an interest-free loan, be sure that the
parties are in an economic position to undo it on short no-
tice.""' It is likely that Congress will, at some time, succumb
to the Service's persistence and create legislation to do away
with the tax-free treatment of these loans. Everyone should be
prepared for that eventuality.
110. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 441(a) 1981 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 150, amending I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1976).
111. Investing the principal in highly liquid funds is favored so that the loan may
be readily repaid.
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